Fiscal policy for a period of transition by Murray L. Weidenbaum
TI Sagreat personal pleasure for me to address
this combined meeting of the Board of Directors of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and of its
Little Rock branch. As a St. Louisian, Ia mkeenly
aware of the important contribution that this institu-
tion is making to our region.
As an economist, Ia mperhaps even more axvare of
the very useful role of the Eighth Federal Reserve
District in emphasizing the importance of monetary
factors in our national economy. I come here to pay
tribute to the pioneering work of the Bank and its
economists even though my own approach to eco-
nomic policy mnay differ in some substantial respects.
I thought that it might be useful today if I pro-
vided some thoughts on that area of economic policy
in which I have particular involvement, and that is
fiscal policy. Before turning to the outlook for the
economy and the budget, I would like to offer some
personal observations on the role of fiscal policy.
Only a few years ago, it seemed that fiscal policy
was all that mattered. Monetary considerations were
largely ignored. In good measure because of the work
of economists specializing in mnonetary policy, I be-
lieve that shortcoming has been corrected. As modern
economists in general now realize, money, of course,
does matter. However, as with mnany things in life,
there is always the danger that the correction will be
carried too far.
I sense a parallel here with the dentist who sees
me as two rows of teeth surrounded by a lot of mis-
cellaneous matter, Similarly, exclusive focus on a sin-
gle economic variable, no matter how important, is
bound to ignore significant characteristics of our com-
plicated economic structure. The fiscal position of the
Government, of course, is also important in economic
Page 14
policy, and from at least two standpoints. On the one
hand, government spending and taxing have a direct
impact on the levels of income and output in the
economy and, hence, on the allocation of resources.
On the other hand, there is the fiscal effect on credit
markets as the Government competes for investment
funds to finance its deficits and related government-
sponsored operations.
Impacts of Fiscal Policy
I thought that it might be helpful if I turn directly
to some of the more recent, and controversial, in-
stances of the use of fiscal policy. Events following
the tax cut of 1964 seemed to verify the predictability
of fiscal policy in promoting, as forecasted, a sub-
stantial expansion in the nation’s output and employ-
ment. The belated tax increase of 1968 did not quite
live up to that earlier standard of predictability in
terms of producing the forecasted behavior in total
spending.
The reasons are complex and deserve careful study.
It does seem to me that disillusionment with fiscal
policy, while understandable, is decidedly premature.
My own analysis of the experience with the imposi-
tion of the income tax surcharge in 1968 convinces
me that changes in taxation do have a visible impact
on the allocation of personal income among consump-
lion, taxation, and saving. The available data do show
that increases in income taxes, temporary or pernian-
ent, do have the desired effects; they do tend as
would be expected — to depress both personal con-
sumption expenditures and personal saving.
However, the precise proportions of these impacts,
as we have seen. may vary according to the changing
influence of many factors~including consumer expec-
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tations concerning the future. lIenee, the repercus-
sions may be more modest than had been expected,
at least by some analysts, but the results seem to me
to he quite clear. A complicating consideration in
analyzing the repercussions may he the sivamping of
effects from tax changes because other factors were
operating. This does not mean that the tax changes,
per se, were not effective; they may merely be hidden
under the surface of more dramnatie events.
For example, consumer spending averaged 78.2
per cent of personal income in the eighteen months
before the Federal income tax surcharge was enacted
in July 1968, and 773 per cent in the 18 months after
that tax increase became effective. If we make what
often is the heroic assumption that all other factors
were held constant, it would appear that the 10 per
cent surcharge caused the proportion of personal in-
come which was devoted to consumption to decline
by nine-tenths of one percentage point. Similarly, the
proportion of income saved dropped by 1.3 percentage
points.
A somewhat more sophisticated analysis would
make some alloxvance for the lags that mnay occur be-
tween the time that personal income is changed and
a shift in consumer spending patterns is evident. For
examnple, the authoritative study at the University of
Michigan by George Katona and Eva Mueller of the
1964 tax legislation rcxc’ded a lag betweemm tax action
and personal spendina of perhaps 6 months or more.
For purposes of illustration, Ict us assume a more
modest three-month I ig for the tc mporary 10 per cent
increase in Federal income tax rates nacted in 1968.
Hence, let us- analy zc th ~ latmonship bc tu een eon-
sumner spending and sasin” in a ‘hen quartem of a
year and the income reed-nc di nthe precedint, war-
ter. On that basis (ce Table 1) the imnposmtio of
the incomne tax surch-mrge is is followed by a drop of
1.2 pe cc tagc points in the proportion of personal
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income devoted to personal consumption expendi-
tures, and a decline of one percentage point in the
savings ratio for the time periods under study. In an
economy tIme size of our oss-n, a one percentage point
shift is quite striking when we translate it into billions
of dollars.
I suggest that, in retrospect, the direct economic
impact of the surcharge was as we should have ex-
pected: the major share of the higher taxes came out
of funds that consumers otherwise would have de-
voted to personal eonsumnption expenditures, and the
remainder emmie out of income that would otherwise
have been saved and invested. To me, this experi-
ence vindicates rather than discredits the usefulness
of fiscal policy for purposes of economic stabilization.
Our experience to date with the phase-out of the
surcharge tends to confirm the pattern of adjustment.
Both consumer spending and consumer saving have
risen as a proportion of personal income, and, here
again, a lagged reaction may be developing. The im-
pact on saving seems to have been greater in the im-
mediate period than it is likely to he in subsequent
months when consumers have had time to adjust their
consumption patterns to their higher disposable in-
come. Hence, we can expect the savings ratio to re-
cede somewhat from its current peak. Certainly, the
phase-out of the surcharge has contributed to the
higher k-vcl of economic activity and, together with
appropriate monetary policy, has enabled us to make
the current eeonoimne adjustment to a less inflationary
economy- without the customary recession.
Hence, the current wave of skepticismn concerning
the effectiveness of fiscal policy seems quite ill—ad-
vised, and Id osense its ebbing. Although fiscal
measures have helped to slow down the economy,
what neither fiscal nor monetary restraint has done
was to arrest quickly a strong inflationary momentum,
This should provide a sobering experience
for advocates in either camp.
To this observer, one clear lesson of the
last few years is the importance of the Fed-
eral fiscal position to money and capital
markets. Federal deficits at high employ-
mnent spell trouble in terms of oyerstrained
financial markets and upward pressures on
interest rates.
To be sure, a distinction between “passive
deficits (resulting from, economic slowup
amid “active deficits” (to stimulate economic
growth) still can he made. As eeonomnic
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slowup develops, Federal receipts fall, and, indeed,
this was a factor in the more-than-projected deficit
of the past fiscal year. This has meant more Federal
financing and more pressure in financial markets,
already feeling the effects of continuing heavy pri-
vate requirements for liquidity. Interest rates, of
course, nevertheless have subsided somewhat — but
not yet in as substantial a degree as has character-
ized many other cyclical slowups. The small declines
of yields in both short- and long-term markets have
been one manifestation of this.
And, as long as the economic adjustment now un-
derway remains small, as it has, the pressure in finan-
cial markets will place limits to the dechne in yields.
The risk is now turning in the other direction — to
higher yields, should the recovery now apparently in
progress move up too fast. Unfortunately, this could
channel the flow of funds to sectors other than those
with high national priority — allocation of credit to
housing, state and local governments, small business-
men, etc.
Hence, appropriate fiscal policy in an economy of
high employment must play a strategic role; the links
between fiscal and monetary policies are complex
and unbreakable.
Some fiscal skeptics fail to see how a few billion
dollars — of government money — can matter one way
or another. What some of the critics forget is that the
extra Federal borrowing, while small relative to total
output, impinges on credit markets whose short-run
capacity is limited. This can be disruptive in terms
of the functioning of markets, the allocation of credit
among different classes of borrowers (e.g., for home
mortgages), and the level of interest rates.
We do need to recognize the practical limitations
under which fiscal policy operates. There are serious
barriers to very frequent changes for short-run stabi-
lization purposes. Political restraints may at times re-
sult in an inappropriate fiscal pohey. Certainly, the
$25 billion budget deficit in the fiscal year 1968 was
a mark of wrong, but not of ineffectual, fiscal pohcy.
In retrospect, we ivould have hoped that fiscal effects
then were weaker than they actually were.
To sum up, there are many sides to the economic
elephant, around which economists are stumbling and
of which we are taking various measurements. Money
matters, as do fiscal actions. The state of our economic
knowledge does not justify a doctrinaire dismissal of
either stabilization pohcy approach. We have too few
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effective economic policy tools to be in a position to
abandon any.
Indeed, as we examine economic policy in recent
periods, we do indeed find that we have continued
to utilize fiscal tools. For example, at the President’s
request, the Congress passed several revenue-raising
measures last year which were designed to assist in
dampening down a then overheated economy.
The items that I have in mind include extending
the 10 per cent income tax surcharge from June 30,
1969 to December 31, 1969, and, at a five per cent
rate, to June 30, 1970. Also, scheduled reductions in
selected excises were postponed one year (and the
Administration has asked that these tax reductions be
postponed again).
It is clear to me that fiscal measures continue to
play an important, but not solitary, role in the execu-
tion of national economic policy.
Federal-State-Local Relations
I would like to turn briefly to an aspect of fiscal
and economic policy that often is overlooked in dis-
cussions of national trends — the interrelationships be-
tween the Federal Government and state and local
governments. The Federal Government, as we know,
possesses rather potent monetary and fiscal tools
which it can use to help promote economic stabiliza-
tion and growth.
In contrast, state and local governments, far more
limited in their fiscal capabilities, are more in the po-
sition of reacting to aggregate economic trends. Many
local govei-nmnents, for example, find themselves in a
budgetary hind when so much of their income comes
from sources not responsive to economic growth, such
as the property tax.
Mindful of the financial problems facing state and
local governments, the Nixon Administration has ad-
vanced an innovative program for sharing a portion
of Federal revenues with states, coummties, and cities,
Under the revenue-sharing proposal, a percentage of
the Federal personal income tax base — time fairly
steadily rising total of individual taxable incomes re-
ported to the Internal Revenue Service — will be dis-
bursed each quarter to every state, cotmnty. and city
in the nation.
Although revenue sharing will not he a panacea, it
should help to strengthen the capability of state and
local governments to respond to the needs of their
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The Outlook
My own reading of the economnic tea leaves leads
me to believe that the economy is in the process of
turning up while inflationary pressures are being re-
duced. However, it is important during this period of
transition to keep the inevitable month-to-month
fluctuations in their proper perspective.
For the period imumediately ahead, each month’s
statistics are not likely to steadily reflect an upturn
in the level of economic activity nor a downward
trend in the rate of inflation. In fact, a short pause
or even a temporary turn for a month or so in some
of these statistical series is quite likely and, in some
cases, has been occurring. We need to avoid confus-
ing these volatile and temporary fluctuations with
changes in the underlying trend.
It is when we examine these underlying trends that
we find the basis for the expectations of advancement
in the level of economic activity and a continued re-
duction in the rate of price increases. Perhaps the
major and very real change that we have been wit-
nessing is in the general atmosphere of improved
expectations.
Despite the current strike in the automobile in-
dustry, I anticipate that meal GNP will rise in the
third quarter of 1970. The results for the fourth quar-
ter will depend in good measure on the extent to
which the strike will continue. In any event, I would
expect the current work stoppage merely to slow
down or interrupt the recovery which is already under
way.
My own evaluation of the economic outlook leads
me to conclude that the upturn will be moderate
enough to be accompanied by continued measurcable
progress in bringing down the rate of inflation. The
performance of both consumer prices and wholesale
prices in recent months is quite reassuring on that
score: ignoring inevitable month-to-mnonth fluctua-
tions, the trend in 1970 to date shows a dampening
in the rate of inflation. My forecast for the coming
year is along the same lines: ignoring inevitable
month-to-month fluctuations, the outlook is for a fur-
ther dampening in the rate of inflation. The specific
degree of improvement in the price level, of course,
will depend in part on the results of decisions in the
private sector on wages and other elements of costs
and prices.
Given this background of economic developments,
the budget situation is a source of considerable at-
tention. It is too early for any definitive statement on
the prospects for the fiscal year 1971. There are still
actions which can, and should, be taken on both the
revenue and expenditure sides which would hold
down the likely deficit to reasonable proportions.
The budget rule announced by the President on
recent occasions certainly provides a good and clear
guide: to keep expenditures within the limits of the
revenues that our Federal tax structure provides at
full employment. By following this guideline, we will
restore budgetary balance when the economy is op-
erating at full potential.
Keeping expenditures within full employment rev-
enues will not he easy to do, especially if new initia-
tives are to be pursued, let alone the general updrift
in costs of existing programs. It is hkely to require
hard decisions on the expenditure side — perhaps
some program deferrals, reductions and phase-outs.
In the area of military spending, the leading indica-
tors all portend a continued slowdown in dollar tenns
and a further decline in real tenns in coming months.
In the longer run, the trend of defense expenditures
will depend on the course of international develop-
ments and this nation’s reaction to them.
In the area of civilian government outlays, Ia m
struck by the cogency of the recent warning of Gas-
par Weinherger, the Deputy Director of the Office of
Management and Budget: “A pilot project normally
turns into an essential program in three years .. The
distance from an urgent priority to an untouchable
sacred cow is usually no more than five fiscal years.”
A fiscal policy adequate and proper for the transi-
tion to a period of renewed growth but lessened in-
flationary pressures calls for a tighter control over
Federal spending. To keep expenditures within the
revenues that can be expected when the economy
returns to full employment will require hard choices
among altem-uative spending programs.
There is much talk these days about the need to
change our priorities. But, there are two parts to the
process. The attractive and much easier part of in-
creasing spending for high priority items has, as we
would expect, received the great bulk of the atten-
tion. We nosy need to focus on the second and
harder step which is necessary in order to achieve
the required shift of resources: identifying those pro-
grams of lower priority which can be reduced, post-
poned, or even eliminated and then taking action to
do so. Not until this second step is accomplished wifi
the necessary changes in priorities truly be effected.
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